Still, the operation achieved its goals and served as a symbol to the services and to the world that the United States had begun to recover from the “Vietnam syndrome.” While much improvement was needed, especially in learning to fight as a joint force, groundwork for future success was already in place. Admiral McDonald’s plan, approved by the Joint Chiefs, dispensed with two important command and control features: the desig- nation of one officer to direct all the ground forces no matter what the service and the selection of the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps to head the Army contingent. Reagan indicated his strong preference for action and steered his national security team in the direction of intervention while withholding a final decision.in the assault. Many of the unfortunate events of the campaign stemmed from his and its exclusion.The U.S. intervention had its roots in a bloody power struggle within the New JEWEL movement in Grenada between Prime Minister and New JEWEL party leader Maurice Bishop and his Deputy Prime Minister and chief Marxist theoretician in the party Bernard Coard. Equipment and manpower were geared toward this mission.The 82d Airborne Division’s buildup of forces on the airfield continued throughout the afternoon and evening of 25–26 October. Cold War and post–Cold War military interventions, although the reasons for the security policies varied from case to case. The airborne troopers were first assigned to guard the Soviet and Cuban embassies to keep them from offering sanctuary to any of the missing Grenadian leaders. In addition, clandestine agent reports from the island indicated that the Grenadians had confined the American medical students to their dormitories and had posted Grenadian troops to keep them there.
The marines of the ANGLICO element identified what they thought was the enemy position and called in an A–7 Corsair. The brigade was not participating in the first wave of the assault, so its timeline for loading was not as short as that of the Rangers, but its schedule was still compressed.
Lack of a single ground force commander meant that coordination between the Marine Corps and the Army on Grenada was poor, and the severing of the corps headquarters from the chain of command complicated the ability of the 82d Airborne Division to deploy from Fort Bragg and to communicate with the other services once it arrived in the area of operations. They enlisted airpower and even commandeered a Cuban bulldozer to assist. These casualties, when added to the 25 Cubans killed and 59 wounded and 45 Grenadians killed and 358 wounded, underscore just how costly a short, intense, no-notice operation could be. The plan that resulted, while flawed, achieved the desired outcome. Of those,airborne assaults are almost always among the most complex, beingheavily dependent on both ample time to prepare and good intelligence.Previous military operations, especially involving the potential rescueof hostages, had more time for planning. During the flight, however, Colonel Taylor received additional intelligence that the Cubans had placed obstacles on the runway, making airlanding unlikely. The administration decided during the early days to deny media representatives—print media and TV news—access to the operation.
Troops of the 82d began their withdrawal and turned over peacekeeping responsibilities to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force.Elements of Colonel Scott’s 3d Brigade continued their advance to the east to clear the southern portion of the island.